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7The Essex Scottish Regiment
in Operation Atlantic
What went wrong?
John Maker
Almost two years after its near-annihilation at Dieppe, the Essex 
Scottish Regiment returned to battle 
on 20 July 1944 at Verrières Ridge and 
was decimated for a second time. It 
had orders to seize an objective under 
hopeless conditions, lacked adequate 
support, and had an inexperienced 
brigadier, Hugh A. Young. What 
went wrong?
	 The	 commanding	 officer	 (CO),	
Lieutenant-Colonel	B.J.S.	MacDonald,	
could	not	convince	his	superior	officer	
and the battalion’s supporting armour 
to intervene at a crucial juncture. 
Young’s failure to intervene cost the 
Essex Scots their reputation and self-
confidence,	 their	 popular	CO,	 and	
244 of their men – dead, wounded, 
or	missing.	Second	Canadian	Corps	
lost an important position astride the 
strategic	high	ground	south	of	Caen,	
and	the	Black	Watch,	which	sought	
to restore the situation, suffered 
many casualties. The heavy losses at 
Verrières Ridge helped to give the 
Essex Scots the dubious distinction 
of suffering the most casualties of 
any	Canadian	 regiment	during	 the	
war. It is unlikely that any member 
of	 the	 regiment	 (or	 any	other	unit)	
could have saved the day, and the 
shabby	 treatment	 that	MacDonald	
received afterwards seems completely 
inappropriate. 
 A  respec ted  lawyer  f rom 
Windsor, 	 Ontario, 	 Bruce	 John	
Stewart	MacDonald	 had	 served	 as	
a	militia	officer	in	the	Essex	Scottish	
from 1929 to 1939, whereupon he 
volunteered for overseas service. He 
was a company commander and, after 
Dieppe, second-in-command of the 
battalion. During the reconstruction 
and retraining of the unit he had 
quickly developed a reputation as 
an excellent trainer and leader; his 
men liked and respected him. In late 
1942 he became chief instructor of the 
4th	Canadian	Infantry	Brigade	Battle	
School, coordinating training at 4th 
Brigade	HQ	for	company-,	battalion-,	
and brigade-sized exercises and 
learning to command at senior levels.1 
When	MacDonald	 took	 command	
in	May	 1943,	Major	 Fred	 Tilston	
(later	recipient	of	the	Victoria	Cross)	
commented in the battalion’s war 
diary: “It is with great relief that 
the command is to be passed to an 
Essex	Scot	and	to	one	such	as	Major	
MacDonald,	who	 is	well	 qualified	
to take over,…[with his] knowledge 
of training methods and his varied 
experience.”2
	 MacDonald	appears	in	the	unit’s	
war diary much more frequently than 
his	predecessor,	Lieutenant-Colonel	
J.H.	Mothersill.	He	organized	both	
battalion and brigade training and 
increased parades and sub-unit 
inspections to improve discipline and 
pride of unit, which had faltered after 
Dieppe.	By	mid-1943	retraining	was	
well under way.3 
	 MacDonald	 “stressed	 the	 great	
responsibility	 that	every	officer	has	
when he leads his men into battle.”4 
He sought to ensure that all ranks 
could command even without higher 
Abstract: On 20-21 July 1944 the 6th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in 
combat operations on Verrières Ridge south 
of Caen. Enemy resistance was stronger 
than expected and the Canadian attack 
was met by strong German counterattacks 
supported by armour. During the course of 
the battle, two units, the Essex Scottish 
Regiment and the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment were driven back. In the 
aftermath of the battle the Essex Scottish 
Regiment and their commanding officer 
were criticized for their poor performance. 
This article examines the battle in an 
attempt to understand who was to blame. 
Lieutentant-Colonel B.J.S MacDonald, the 
commanding officer of the Essex Scots, 
was fired for his role in the battle, but this 
article posits that Brigadier Hugh A. Young 
bears the greater share of responsibility for 
the operation’s failure.
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8authority, having “each [platoon] 
exercised	in	drill	by	the	[officer],	then	
by several [private] soldiers.”5 When 
the Essex Scots “boarded American 
vessels	for	the	journey	to	France”	on	
4 July 19446 they could reasonably 
anticipate success in battle. 
 This article will examine the 
planning for the assault at Verrières 
Ridge, the attack itself, responses 
to	Brigadier	Young’s	 report	 on	 the	
event,	and	the	conflicting	sources	that	
make	it	difficult	to	understand	what	
really happened. 
Planning the Assault
On the night of 19 July 1944, in Operation	 Atlantic,	 the	 2nd	
Canadian	Infantry	Division	received	
orders to carry 21 Army Group’s 
advance southward from the southern 
outskirts	 of	Caen	 and	 to	 establish	
itself on Verrières Ridge. The next 
day	6th	Canadian	 Infantry	Brigade	
moved forward with the Essex Scots 
under command for an advance on 
the ridge. The brigade commander 
was	Brigadier	H.A.	Young,“an	RMC	
graduate without previous combat 
experience.”7 The crest of Verrières 
runs roughly east-west and affords 
a commanding view both north and 
south. The German defenders could 
see	 clearly	 the	 Anglo-Canadian	
advance from the north. Tactically, 
capture of the ridge was crucial 
to	 II	 Canadian	Corps’	 southward	
advance, as it would afford a view 
south across nearby Roqancourt and 
almost	 to	Falaise,	where	 the	British	
army would eventually meet the 
Americans in August.
	 	Operation	Goodwood,	the	major	
British	 armoured	 attack	 to	 capture	
Verrières	Ridge,	 had	 failed.	 By	 19	
July	VIII	British	Corps	had	lost	about	
270 tanks and many men and was 
organizing its withdrawal. Although 
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, 
commander	 of	 II	Canadian	Corps,	
assumed	that	these	British	attempts	
had softened up German resistance, 
the decision to attack the ridge with 
a “fresh infantry division” proved 
costly.8	 British	 pressure	 to	 break	
the	German	line	and	Montgomery’s	
insistence that the advance continue 
forced Simonds’ hand. 
	 The	 6th	Brigade	plan	 of	 attack	
involved four infantry battalions. 
The	Cameron	Highlanders	of	Canada	
would advance on the right flank 
against	 St.	André-sur-Orne,	where	
they would probably meet enemy 
armour; the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment would attack in the centre 
towards the crest of the ridge; and 
the	Fusiliers	de	Mont-Royal	(FMRs)	
would advance on the left flank 
towards Verrières, just below the 
ridge’s summit.9 The Essex Scots were 
to advance behind the South Sasks 
and	 set	 up	 a	 firm	base	 behind	 the	
forward centre battalion and might 
leapfrog the South Sasks if the latter 
were able to consolidate on their 
objectives. 
 “A” Squadron of  the 27th 
Canadian	 Armoured	 Regiment	
(Sherbrooke	Fusiliers)	was	to	support	
the	 attack	 on	 St.	André-sur-Orne,	
“C”	 Squadron	was	 to	 support	 the	
FMRs	on	the	left,	while	“B”	Squadron	
remained in reserve at regimental 
and	brigade	headquarters	(HQ)	near	
Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce MacDonald, 
commander of the Essex Scottish Regiment 
during the attack on Verrières Ridge, was 
removed from his position because he was 
seen as being nervous and not properly 
able to control his battalion during the 
battle.
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9Ifs.10	 “A”	 and	“C”	Squadrons	were	
to	 direct	 fire	 from	 rearward,	 hull-
down	positions	to	support	the	flanks	
and deal with any enemy armour 
that	appeared;	“B”	would	act	at	the	
brigadier’s discretion. Artillery was 
on	 call	 as	 needed.	 Sixth	 Brigade’s	
orders termed the Sherbrookes “the 
basis of [the] counter-attack force.”11 
The decision to limit armoured 
support in the centre would prove 
disastrous.
	 HQs	 of	 both	 2nd	Division	 and	
6th	 Brigade	 underestimated	 the	
German forces facing the attackers. 
According	 to	 6th	 Brigade’s	 war	
diary, the “presumption was that 
the opposition on our front was not 
great and that quick offensive action 
should break through readily the 
enemy screen.”12	Messages	from	2nd	
Division	 to	6th	Brigade	portray	 the	
German 272nd Infantry Division, 
which held the front along the line 
Verrières–Fontenay-le-Marmion–St.	
André-sur-Orne,	as	inferior	to	the	1st	
and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which 
intelligence suggested the 272nd 
had recently relieved on both sides 
of	the	Orne.13 “As late as 14 July this 
lower-grade [division] reported on 
its	way	from	the	south	of	France.”14 
The 272nd soon showed itself capable 
of fierce fighting, and, as quickly 
became clear, it had support from 
armoured battlegroups of the 1st SS 
and 2nd Panzer Divisions.15
The Attack on Verrières 
Ridge, 20-21 July 1944
That long 20 July began at 0115 hours when the Essex Scots, on 
little sleep and no food, were ordered 
to prepare to move. Their advance 
began at 0800 hours, and, once they 
reached	 the	 6th	Brigade	 area,	 they	
received “a poor breakfast and 
little or no noon meal.”16 According 
to	 6th	 Brigade,	 they	were	 not	 at	
their	 forming-up	point	 (FUP)	until	
1300 hours, two hours before the 
attack.17 The regiment’s war diary 
indicates	arrival	at	the	FUP	and	the	
start of digging in at 1130 hours 
and completion by 1300 hours; it 
maintains that the enemy began 
shelling	the	FUP	at	1300	hours.
 The artillery barrage began at 
1435 hours and 25 minutes later the 
three	battalions	of	6th	Brigade	crossed	
the start-line.18 “It was a spectacular 
sight seeing this advance over a front 
of some 4000 yards.”19 All three units 
reported	“FOREST”	as	they	reached	
the intermediate report line. However, 
the South Sasks were ambushed by 
infantry of the German 272nd and 
lost the barrage. The Germans had 
cannily	held	fire	for	days,	convincing	
British	 army	 intelligence	 that	 this	
sector was unoccupied. The South 
Sasks attempted to sustain forward 
momentum:	 “B	 Coy	 had	 pushed	
through	D	Coy	at	the	double	to	catch	
up to our barrage…shortly after A 
Coy	on	our	left	encountered	the	first	
of many enemy posts.”20 
 Despite  ferocious German 
resistance, elements of the South 
Sasks reached their objective. The 
sources disagree, however, about 
how	quickly	they	reached	their	final	
objective. The post-battle entry in 6th 
Brigade’s	war	 diary	 states	 that	 by	
1700 hours the South Sasks reported 
Brigadier Hugh A. Young commanded the 
6th Canadian Infantry Brigade during 
the 20 July 1944 attack on Verrières 
Ridge. Though he blamed the failure of 
the operation on his subordinates, the 
evidence makes it clear that he did not 
have a solid grip on the battle.
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two companies on their objective.21 
According to the day’s operations 
log, however, at 1650 hours the 
Sasks were still 200 yards from the 
objective,	 and	 “A”	 Company	 did	
not radio success until 1725 hours. 
At	 1732	 hours	 “D”	Company	 also	
reported	 success.	 The	 Camerons	
sent	back	 their	 codeword,	MAPLE,	
at	 1650	hours.	 Sixth	Brigade’s	war	
diary stated: “the situation on the 
front of these two [battalions] was 
very satisfactory, consequently at 
about 1730 hours the Essex Scot were 
ordered to move to their [position] 
with all possible speed.”22 
 According to the log, the Essex 
Scots were ordered forward at 1727 
hours, a mere two minutes after the 
South Sasks’ leading elements had 
reported	POPLAR	 and	 before their 
“D”	Company	reached	the	objective.	
Therefore the brigade war diary’s 
account, with the South Sasks reaching 
their objective and consolidating for a 
half-hour,		allowing	Brigadier	Young	
time to assess the situation before he 
ordered the Essex forward, seems 
erroneous. Young ordered the Essex 
to advance only as the Sasks were 
reaching their objective. The two-
minute interim did not permit proper 
analysis of the situation. It appears 
that	brigade	HQ	could	have	known	
only	 that	 the	 Sasks’	 “A”	Company	
had arrived at the objective. Had 
Young waited a half-hour he would 
have seen the situation deteriorate: 
18 minutes after the two forward 
companies	arrived	6th	Brigade	heard	
from the Sasks only that “We are 
being attacked by tanks.”23
 The enemy “started to lay down 
heavy mortar and artillery fire 
accurately fired onto [the Sasks’] 
positions.”24	At	 that	 point	 the	first	
enemy tanks appeared, knocking 
out some of the battalion’s anti-
tank	guns	and	firing	on	the	exposed	
infantry.	 One	 Sask	 officer,	Major	
John Edmondson, commander of 
“B”	Company,	 recalled,	 “One	 tank	
came right into my left forward 
platoon driving right over top of 
people it didn’t shoot.”25 As the 
German counterattack intensified, 
the Saskatchewan infantry went to 
ground in the waist-high grass, which 
hid it from the panzers, who could 
now	traverse	the	ridge	at	will	and	fire	
on anything that moved. The enemy’s 
continuing	mortar	fire	inflicted	further	
casualties;	 acting	 CO	Major	 G.R.	
Matthews	 –	 already	wounded	 and	
furiously sending support requests 
to brigade – and battalion Intelligence 
Officer	Lieutenant	D.S.	Pedlow	both	
“received an almost direct hit” in the 
battalion	HQ	carrier	vehicle,	which	
also knocked out communications.26 
 The beginning of a heavy rainstorm 
further complicated communication 
and observation, but consolidation 
continued. “The 6-pounders, mortars, 
carrier and pioneer platoons were 
ordered forward to help prepare 
a battalion ‘fortress’ but these also 
came under attack from infantry and 
armour appearing over the ridge 
from the southwest at 1750 hours.”27 
The battalion war diary reported that 
“The	 tanks	 attacked	 “D”	Company	
with	HE	 [high	 explosive]	 and	MG	
[machine	gun]	fire.”28 Then an enemy 
counterattack from the southeast 
overran	“B”	Company	and	destroyed	
the remaining anti-tank guns that 
were moving to their consolidation 
positions. “The tanks came right up 
to the crest of the hill and started 
to	 lay	 down	 [heavy]	HE	 and	MG	
fire causing heavy casualties.”29 
In the face of such overwhelming 
firepower,	some	officers	ordered	the	
exposed infantry to withdraw to the 
cover of the waist-high grain. Then 
“the tanks, once they had no easy 
targets,	sprayed	the	wheat	fields	with	
machine	gun	fire	and	turned	circles	
through the wheat in an effort to 
crush	the	men	or	flush	them	into	the	
open	so	they	could	be	fired	upon.”30 
	 According	 to	 6th	 Brigade’s	
operations log, the South Sasks 
urgently requested assistance at 1750 
hours	 and	again	five	minutes	 later:	
“We are being attacked by tanks. 
We need help from the tank counter 
attack	 coming	 from	 the	 SOUTH.”31 
This was the last message received 
from the beleaguered battalion for 
the next two hours, presumably 
because	of	the	destruction	of	the	HQ	
carrier vehicle, along with the loss 
of	 the	 acting	CO.	When	 the	 Sasks	
finally were in touch again, they 
reported enemy shelling and further 
casualties.32 Requests for assistance 
started arriving 23 minutes after the 
lead South Sask elements reached the 
objective, but before the Essex had 
reached its consolidation position. 
The Essex’s orders entailed forming 
a	firm	base	for	the	South	Sasks,	which	
necessitated time to create	a	firm	base	
before the Germans counterattacked 
the Sasks and forced them back. 
 The Essex Scots started moving at 
1727 hours. They reported reaching 
their objective and starting to dig in at 
1820 hours, a half-hour after the start 
of the German counterattack which 
had decimated the Sasks in plain sight, 
just several hundred yards forward.33 
During the counterattack, one of the 
Sasks’	two	surviving	senior	officers,	
Major	L.L.	Dickin,	went	back	to	inform	
Essex	CO	MacDonald	that	the	Sasks	
could not survive on the objective 
they had so recently occupied. As 
a result, they would retire behind 
the forward Essex positions which 
were not yet fully consolidated. 
Dickin and Edmondson then went 
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to inform Young of the situation 
in hopes of receiving armoured or 
artillery	 support.	Underestimating	
the opposition, Young gave orders 
to hold the position on the slopes of 
the ridge and offered no armoured 
support. 
 Returning to the unit, Dickin 
and Edmondson found remnants 
of the South Sasks withdrawing 
through the Essex forward positions 
back	to	their	FUP.34 Some stayed on 
the slopes to assist the Essex Scots, 
but the unopposed Panzers again 
pinned	 them	 to	 the	 ground.	Many	
of the Sasks who had fallen back 
were wounded or withdrawing to 
more defensible positions. Staying 
up front would almost certainly 
have spelled annihilation, and the 
company commanders’ decision to 
withdraw doubtless saved lives. 
 According to the South Sasks’ war 
diary	 and	 6th	Brigade’s	 operations	
log, the battalion’s companies were 
in retreat before the Essex Scots had 
reached their objective:
The	 remainder	 of	 “B”	 [Company]	
then	withdrew	through	the	grain	field	
through	“C”	[Company]	area.	Major	
J.S. Edmondson then reported the 
[position] of the line of the forward 
troops	 to	 [Brigade	Command	Post]	
at Ifs. The Essex Scottish who were 
in reserve, then came forward and 
started to dig in…the remainder of 
the S Sask R then withdrew through 
the Essex Scottish, with the exception 
of some of the boys.35 
Even though many South Sasks 
remained with the Essex Scots to help 
mount a defence large numbers of 
Sasks continued to withdraw directly 
through the Essex positions. 
 The forward Essex companies, 
now struck by tanks and artillery, 
began to withdraw. Verbal reports 
began to come in that elements 
of	 “A”	 and	 “B”	 Companies	were	
coming back.36 The Essex reported 
to	6th	Brigade:	“[Tanks]	south	of	the	
[crossroads].”37 Then, more ominous, 
“There are two tanks in front of our 
“D”	 [Company],	We	 need	 [anti-
tank support] immediately.”38 “D” 
Company	was	 one	 of	 the	 reserve	
Essex companies, and this message 
suggests that the forward companies 
had already been turned back and 
urgently needed artillery, armour, 
or anti-tank weapons. What could 
the unsupported and exposed South 
Sasks and Essex Scots do against 
strongly-entrenched enemy troops, 
panzers and a constant shower of 
mortar and artillery shells?
 The tanks of the Sherbrooke 
Fusiliers’	“A”	and	“C”	Squadrons	did	
little to address the centre battalions’ 
predicament.	“C”	Squadron	reported	
efforts	to	reach	a	good	firing	position	
near	 Beauvoir	 Farm,	 but	 “things	
became too hot,” so it withdrew.39 
Sergeant	Olivier	of	“C”	Squadron,	in	
a	Firefly	tank,	maintained	that	as	he	
took up a position on the high ground 
overlooking St. André in support 
of	 the	Camerons	he	observed	 three	
panzers near Verrières village and 
fired	on	 them.	The	 rain	 and	 smoke	
prevented him from seeing whether 
he scored any hits. He did notice the 
Panzers	returning	fire,	so	he	moved	
his tank behind a hill under cover 
of smoke.40 His fire appears to be 
one	of	 the	 few	significant	 instances	
Sherman tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers 
were positioned behind Verrières Ridge 
but Brigadier Young never gave the order 
to commit them to battle.
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of support near the centre all day. 
Although	 6th	 Brigade’s	 pre-attack	
plan	designated	“B”	Squadron	as	a	
counterattack force, no such move 
ever occurred, or was ordered. The 
reserve squadron moved out only to 
reinforce success on the right, behind 
the	Camerons.
	 Meanwhile,	back	on	the	ridge,	the	
Essex’s	“A”	and	“B”	Companies	had	
begun to withdraw, not necessarily 
out	 of	 control	 as	 Brigadier	 Young	
and some historians have since 
suggested.	According	to	MacDonald	
and	Captain	D.W.	McIntyre	 (“B”	
Company	commander),	the	men	had	
been unable to consolidate because 
they had been ordered forward 
during a counterattack and the 
enemy	had	directed	all	kinds	of	fire	
on	them.	McIntyre	consulted	with	the	
“A”	Company	commander	and	they	
jointly	decided	to	withdraw,	chiefly	
because they were being attacked by 
mortar,	machine	gun	and	 tank	fire,	
and had lost communication with 
battalion	HQ.
 Edmondson perhaps observed 
this party as he set off to report to 
Young:
When we set off, I noticed small 
figures	 far	down	 the	 slope	 in	 front	
of the St. André crossroads stand up 
and converge for a moment as if to 
consult and then double to the rear. 
Some of the forward elements of the 
Essex Scottish were withdrawing. 
To me they were in a precarious 
position and had to seek cover from 
the	intense	enemy	fire.41
	 MacDonald	 ordered	McIntyre	
to gather up his men and dig them 
in	 behind	 “D”	 Company.	 Only	 a	
portion	of	“B”	Company	dug	in.	The	
rest	of	“B”	had,	on	McIntyre’s	orders,	
returned	 to	 the	 FUP	 to	 evacuate	
casualties. That these men later 
appeared in the rear does not prove 
that	 “B”	 Company	 retreated	 in	
panic.42	“The	B	Company	withdrawal	
appears to have been well handled and 
controlled otherwise.”43	MacDonald	
later admitted, however, that “A” 
Company,	 having	 lost	 all	 of	 its	
officers	and	most	non-commissioned	
officers	 (NCOs),	 retreated	 in	 some	
disorder.	Clearly	 only	parts	 of	 the	
Essex forward companies actually 
“broke” and “collapsed,” while the 
remainder withdrew in an orderly 
and controlled manner. 
	 MacDonald	 attempted	 to	 keep	
control of his battalion by ordering 
the	lead	(now	retreating)	companies	
to halt and dig in behind the reserve 
Essex companies, which then became 
the forward units. At 2000 hours he 
toured these companies and tried to 
settle	his	 justifiably	unnerved	men.	
The	CO	claims	that	he,
talked	to	nearly	every	man.	I	satisfied	
myself with the positions held, the 
forward ones…I told the men they 
were now the forward companies 
and must hold on at all cost. Some 
were shaken a bit by the S Sask R 
and	A	and	B	Coy	withdrawals,	but	
seemed reassured and steadied by 
my visit.”44
As	MacDonald	 ordered,	 these	 two	
companies held their ground just 
short of their assigned objective. 
They did not allow further enemy 
penetration that night, despite 
constant shelling. 
	 MacDonald	returned	to	the	FUP	
near Ifs to see if he could arrange 
food and hot drinks for his men in 
the forward areas and to find the 
men	 from	 “A”	 and	 “B”	who	 had	
withdrawn. While en route he learned 
from Young that 100 Essex Scots were 
at	the	FUP.	MacDonald	was	surprised	
at that number but he understood 
that	 “A”	 and	 “B”	Companies	 had	
Canadian infantry on the move south of Caen.
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suffered many casualties and that 
McIntyre	 had	 detailed	 about	 30	
men to evacuate the wounded. 
Presumably many of those in the rear 
were walking wounded and so might 
appear to Young to be improperly out 
of battle. 
	 MacDonald	found	about	50	men	
at	 the	 FUP.45 Sometime after 2100 
hours,	according	to	MacIntyre,	“The	
C.O.…ordered	me	to	get	in	his	carrier	
and go to the rear and pick up my 
thirty men who had been evacuating 
casualties and collect the remnants of 
“A”	Company	who	had	previously	
been withdrawn and were without 
an	officer.”46 
	 At	the	FUP,	MacDonald	marched	
the	men	 he	 found	 to	 brigade	HQ	
to	 refit	 them	 for	 battle	 and	 supply	
ammunition. According to him, 
brigade was unable to replenish the 
men, so he ordered them to stay in 
the rear, have a good meal and a 
decent night’s sleep, and be ready to 
return to the line in the morning, once 
brigade	HQ	had	ammunition.	Young	
appears to have again encountered 
these men and went to division to 
acquire ammunition and weapons for 
them. The men received new supplies 
at 0400 hours, complete with orders 
from	both	MacDonald	 and	Young	
to return to the line. Lieutenant A. 
McCrimmon,	 previously	 left	 out	
of battle, led about 14 men to the 
front at 0300 hours, reorganized “A” 
Company,	and	took	command.47
	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Essex	 forward	
companies spent the night in their 
wet slit trenches and kept watch on 
the blood-soaked slopes in front of 
them. During the night rain, mud, 
and non-stop mortaring had made 
many weapons unusable. “The 
men worked continuously on their 
[weapons], even tearing off their 
shirts for rags in a futile attempt to 
keep them in order.”48 
	 At	first	light,	eight	enemy	tanks	
were	loitering	around	“C”	Company’s	
area, with infantry and snipers in 
tow.49 German tanks and infantry 
maintained constant machine gun and 
small	arms	fire.	MacDonald	returned	
to Ifs, as he had received orders at 
0930 hours to meet with the brigadier 
and apparently intended to request 
armoured support. When he arrived 
Young was absent, so he decided 
to acquire such support by himself. 
The	 tanks	 in	 “C”	Company’s	 area,	
he reported, “were so positioned that 
our [anti-tank] guns and PIATs could 
not get at them. There were many of 
our own tanks in the vicinity, but 
they did not appear to be taking any 
action. I asked one tank commander 
personally for help, but he flatly 
refused.”50 
	 Back	in	“C”	Company’s	sector,	the	
enemy had moved into position in the 
dark for an armoured counterattack 
on the morning of 21 July. The 
reinforced enemy again struck at 
the weakest point in the line, the 
6th	Brigade’s	shaken	centre	held	by	
the harried Essex Scots. The enemy 
Knocked out tanks remain on Verrières 
Ridge after the battle.  The open nature 
of the terrain is apparent from this 
photograph.
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tanks started harassing the forward 
troops at about 0900 hours, and the 
attack continued throughout the 
morning as more enemy troops and 
tanks arrived. The barrage cut off 
“C”	Company,	No.17	 Platoon	 and	
battalion	HQ	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
unit.	Many	men	were	captured,	with	
the Germans marching them into 
captivity.51 
 Some men started withdrawing 
in the face of the continued German 
attacks.	 Further,	 those	 from	 “A”	
and	“B”	Companies	with	orders	 to	
return to the front remained at the 
FUP.	 Young	 ordered	MacDonald	
to intercept the men who were 
coming out and re-form them on 
an intermediate position. At about 
1100	hours	he	also	told	MacDonald	
to	 take	 the	men	 from	“A”	and	“B”	
Companies	with	him	to	start	digging	
in on the intermediate position, 
which	 surprised	MacDonald,	who	
had thought these men already at the 
front, as per his orders. Although some 
Essex Scots were moving rearward 
as a result of the German pressure, 
“elements of two [companies] were 
still in the forward area,”52 and the 
battalion continued to hold the line.
	 As	ordered,	the	Essex	CO	formed	
the battalion on the intermediate 
position and passed word through 
to  the  forward companies  to 
withdraw to that point. The German 
counterattack, along with the Essex 
withdrawal, created a salient between 
the	Camerons	on	 the	 right	 and	 the	
FMRs	on	the	left.	The	Essex	held	its	
new position and received orders 
to secure and prepare a start-line 
for	 the	Black	Watch,	which	was	 to	
attack through the Essex in order to 
reoccupy the forward positions that 
the Essex had occupied the previous 
night.	At	1800	hours	the	Black	Watch	
counterattacked	 the	Germans	 (this	
time	with	 armoured	 support)	 and	
recaptured the “lost” ground, thereby 
stabilizing the front. The Essex 
remained in its intermediate position 
until 2200 hours, when it was relieved 
by	the	Royal	Regiment	of	Canada.
Responses to Young’s Report 
Brigadier Young’s report on the operation blamed the retreat 
and	casualties	on	Lieutenant-Colonel	
MacDonald’s	 failure	 to	 control	 his	
men, his nervousness and seeming 
breakdown, his unsuitability for 
command, and the men’s resulting 
lack	of	confidence	in	him.	But	Young	
himself acted questionably during 
and especially after the battle. His 
attack plan was flawed, and the 
battalion	 COs	 knew	 it.	However,	
Foulkes	 and	 Simonds	 agreed	with	
Young’s conclusions and relieved 
MacDonald	of	command.
	 MacDonald 	 very 	 s t rongly	
protested the adverse report and 
cited five reasons why the attack 
failed.	 First,	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	
communication from the outset, 
unexpected and overpowering 
enemy action and bad weather. 
Second, both the South Sasks and 
the two forward Essex companies 
had to withdraw in the face of heavy 
enemy armoured counterattacks. 
Third, these enemy assaults caused 
many	casualties.	Fourth,	according	to	
MacDonald,	a	series	of	contradictory	
orders from Young made absolute 
compliance	next	to	impossible.	Fifth,	
the brigadier refused to permit the 
men	 from	“A”	and	“B”	Companies	
whom he found at his command 
post to return to battle, despite 
MacDonald’s	orders.53 
	 Fo l l owing 	 h i s 	 d i smi s sa l ,	
MacDonald	 asked	 his	 company	
commanders to determine whether 
the other ranks indeed lacked 
confidence	in	him.	The	entire	battalion,	
apparently without his urging, signed 
a petition in support of him.54	Many	
of the men approached him and 
reassured him of their continuing 
confidence	and	stated	“their	feeling	
that I have been unjustly punished for 
something I could not help.”55 
	 The	 Essex	 war	 diarist,	 Fred	
Tilston, had written on 22 July:
It is not a pleasant picture to realize 
that so many of the [battalion] 
have been lost, especially when the 
action was not successful and many 
of the casualties could have been 
avoided by better planning and the 
observance of the procedure that our 
[training] had led us to believe would 
be followed before going into battle. 
All of the rules of man management 
were either violated or ignored, by 
the sudden move ordered after mid-
night, the loss of sleep by all ranks, a 
poor breakfast and little or no noon 
meal before battle, and the general or 
detailed picture and plan, if known, 
was	not	given	to	the	junior	[officers]	
or troops.56
 Higher command, of course, had 
ordered the untimely moves, botched 
“man management,” and failed to pass 
on	 crucial	 intelligence.	MacDonald	
commented that “psychologically 
everything was wrong and as far 
from what might have been imagined 
as the proper preparation for their 
first	battle.”57 
	 MacDonald	 had	 little	 faith	 in	
Young’s plan: “insofar as inspiring 
confidence is concerned I must 
admit that I lacked confidence in 
the [brigadier’s] plan, which did fail 
to a large extent.”58	Officers	 of	 the	
South	 Sasks	 echoed	MacDonald’s	
misgivings.	Lieutenant-Colonel	Clift,	
temporarily	replacing	Brigadier	Lett	
of	4th	Brigade,	stressed	the	need	for	
armoured support. “I had asked, 
and was granted, a tank squadron 
in direct support, because of the 
long assault, the rising ground at 
the objective, and the chances of a 
quick tank cum infantry attack by 
the enemy.”59 However, on 19 July, 
Ph
ot
o 
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f H
ar
dy
 W
he
el
er
, L
Co
l (
R
et
’d
), 
R
eg
im
en
ta
l A
rc
hi
vi
st
, E
ss
ex
 a
nd
 K
en
t S
co
tt
is
h 
R
eg
im
en
t
9
Maker: The Essex Regiment and Operation Atlantic
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
16
the	 acting	 CO,	Major	Matthews,	
had	informed	his	officers	that	there	
would be no supporting armour. 
“The only support we could count 
on was indirect support of the 
Armour.”60 Young’s removal of tanks 
was	confirmed	in	6th	Brigade’s	final	
orders.61 
	 Young	had	accused	MacDonald	
of being nervous and uncontrolled. 
MacDonald	claims	that	after	arriving	
at	brigade	HQ	as	summoned	at	0930	
hours, he awaited the brigadier until 
1100 hours. During this time, the 
Essex Scots were under attack and 
needed	 their	CO,	yet	he	waited	 for	
Young	to	return.	MacDonald	had:
no food for a day and a half, 
practically no sleep for two nights 
and had been soaked to the skin with 
water and mud for 5 or 6 hrs, and 
was consequently thoroughly chilled 
and cold. I was indignant at the 
lack of tank support, the casualties 
from	artillery	fire,	 the	 lack	of	 food	
and	drink,	 the	men	 from	A	and	B	
coys who still had not reported, 
and concerned about the fighting 
condition of our weapons. I felt that 
unless something could be done, we 
would have difficulty in resisting 
any determined counterattack…
[Brigadier	Young]	was	 apparently	
not suffering from any of these 
physical discomforts or worries and 
was very composed. He refused to 
see that anything was wrong, or that 
I had any basis for my complaint 
and misgivings respecting support. 
It	seemed	sufficient	 to	him	that	we	
had an armoured regiment standing 
around in the hills, whether they did 
anything to help us or not, while the 
Panthers harassed us at will with 
88mm	and	MMG	fire,	and	obviously	
intended to support an attack on 
our	 position…My	 feelings	were	
less nervous than frustration and 
suppressed anger at his impatient 
attitude toward me and my inability 
to move him.62
MacDonald	 doubtless	 appeared	
anxious and annoyed, but he and 
the South Sask officers had good 
reason to be so. Every one of the 
commanding officers who went 
to see Young for help was excited, 
which the inexperienced brigadier 
interpreted as nervousness and 
hysteria, instead of a reasonable 
reaction to a desperate situation. In 
his	post-battle	letters	to	Foulkes	and	
Simonds,	MacDonald	 states	 that	
Young was unduly impatient with 
him.	 John	 Edmondson,	 acting	CO	
of the South Sasks, also recounted 
the brigadier’s impatience and 
annoyance. The South Sask major 
describes	 brigade	HQ	 that	 day	 as	
“in a state of confusion because they 
didn’t know what was going on. 
They seemed to change their mind 
from moment to moment.… the 
Brigade	Commander	offered	no	help	
to alleviate the immediate desperate 
situation.”63 Later, when Lieutenant-
Colonel	 Gauvreau	 of	 the	 FMRs	
arrived to report the situation on the 
left	flank,	Young	remarked	that	he	was	
“somewhat excited.”64 It is clear that 
Young was unduly impatient with 
his battalion commanders in that he 
told Edmondson to calm down, and 
then	 accused	MacDonald	of	 losing	
control, subsequently claiming that 
he	was	not	fit	to	command.	However,	
the tactical shortcomings exposed in 
this	attack	were	not	MacDonald’s	or	
Edmondson’s, but Young’s.
Conflicting Sources 
Operations logs, war diaries, and a formal inquiry offer a wealth 
of conflicting information about 
the assault on Verrières Ridge. The 
operations logs recorded events as 
they happened, the war diarist wrote 
his piece after	the	battle,	and	the	Court	
of	 Enquiry	 in	 the	 Field	 gathered	
verbal	 testimony	under	 oath.	C.P.	
Stacey ranks the operations log as the 
most reliable source by far:
Here the historian has before him 
the record of information received 
and sent out, of orders given and 
received. Every entry is timed. The 
record is strictly contemporary; it 
is almost wholly impersonal; and 
it is maintained, not for historical 
purposes, as the unit or formation 
war diary is, but as an instrument for 
fighting	the	battle…If	a	division’s	log	
is available, you can write the history 
of	 that	division’s	 part	 in	 the	fight	
with	confidence;	if	it	is	missing,	you	
are hamstrung.65
Young undoubtedly read and 
approved the brigade war diary 
prior to its filing and even added 
some sections himself, yet it does 
not correspond with other evidence. 
The war diary maintains that, as a 
result of the South Sasks’ second call 
for help, the reserve squadron of the 
Sherbrooke	Fusiliers,	 as	well	 as	 an	
additional troop from “A” Squadron 
near St. André, was “ordered across” 
to help the Sasks.66 However, the 
Sherbrooke	 Fusiliers’	 war	 diary	
and the ops log make no mention 
of any such orders. Additionally, 
Sherbrooke after-action reports never 
mention moving out in support of 
the centre; certainly the South Sasks 
and the Essex Scots never saw tanks 
in	close	support.	Furthermore,	there	
are numerous timing inconsistencies 
between	the	6th	Brigade’s	operations	
log and its war diary. The war diary 
paints an orderly picture of the 
advance	 in	which	brigade	HQ	took	
a half-hour to assess the situation 
before committing the Essex Scots. 
According to the log, however, 
brigade could have had no more than 
three minutes to decide. 
 Young wrote in the war diary, 
“the	chief	difficulty	experienced	by	all	
four [battalions] was the devastating 
mortar and [artillery] fire which 
descended upon them immediately 
they reached their objectives.”67 While 
artillery and mortar fire inflicted 
numerous casualties, infantry of both 
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the South Sasks and the Essex Scots 
had to withdraw chiefly because, 
once they had lost their anti-tank 
weapons, they could not deal with 
the attacking enemy tanks. In the 
ops log almost every request for 
assistance mentions the presence of 
German armour. 
 Testimony gathered during 
the inquiry suggests that enemy 
armour was the prime reason for 
difficulty.68 Numerous witnesses 
stated, and the court concluded, 
that enemy armour caused many 
losses.	Company	Sergeant-Major	W.J.	
Foster	of	“C”	Company	of	the	Essex	
Scots	testified,	“During	the	hours	of	
darkness 8 Tiger Tanks moved into 
the rear of our position with 4 on our 
right	flank.	These	 tanks	continually	
harassed our position.”69 According 
to	 D.W.	MacIntyre,	 commander	
of	 “B”	 Company,	 “at	 1800	 hours	
20 July 44 my company occupied 
a forward position in support of 
the	 South	 Sask	Regt.	On	 our	 left	 I	
observed a number of Tiger tanks 
after	 they	had	been	firing	at	us	 for	
some time.” He added, “At 1930 
hours I started to withdraw…a 
number of my men had to carry 
wounded which meant other men 
had to carry two or more weapons…I 
know all my weapons that were 
missing were, with the exception of 
one P.I.A.T., destroyed as a result of 
enemy action.”70	Clearly	the	forward	
units “did not drop their weapons 
and run.”71	Major	 T.E.	 Steele,	 “D”	
Company	Commander	testified	that	
in the morning, “I observed 7 enemy 
tanks to my rear right. I suspected 
these tanks to be there during the 
night	 as	we	had	been	heavily	fired	
upon…at approximately 1555 hours 
we were heavily counterattacked…”72 
Acting	Company	Sergeant-Major	R.R.	
Case,	commanding	the	Essex	Carrier	
Platoon, testified that, “my own 
carrier was completely destroyed by 
an	88mm	shell	(the	Tiger	tank’s	main	
armament).”73	 Company	 Sergeant-	
Major	 J.W.	Coldwell	 of	 the	 South	
Sasks’	 “A”	Company	 testified	 that	
they were “prevented from digging 
in by enemy fire and six tanks.”74 
Captain	G.E.	Colgate,	in	command	of	
the South Sasks’ Anti-Tank Platoon, 
testified,	“Some	of	the	guns	were	still	
moving into position when they were 
fired upon by enemy tanks. They 
tried	 to	 return	fire	 but	 in	doing	 so	
we	lost	4	T.16	Carriers	through	tank	
fire.”75	Lieutenant	S.M.	Carter	states,	
“We had been digging in for about 15 
minutes when we were attacked by 
about half a dozen tanks… I saw the 
tanks	overrun	“B”	Company…	(who)	
started to infiltrate back through 
us and then they were shelled by 
German 88mms… The two forward 
platoons in my company were over-
run by tanks.”76
 R e g a r d i n g  a n y  m a t e r i a l 
deficiencies,	the	court	ruled	“that	the	
deficiencies	were	 caused	by	 enemy	
action and could not have been 
avoided. There is no suggestion in 
the evidence that arms or equipment 
was deliberately discarded or 
thrown away, or that the unit or any 
Major Fred Tilston, who would later be awarded the Victoria Cross for 
his actions in the Rhineland, spoke for the Regiment when he wrote 
in the Essex Scots’ war diary after the battle:
It is not a pleasant picture to realize that so many of the 
[battalion] have been lost, especially when the action was 
not successful and many of the casualties could have 
been avoided by better planning…All of the rules of man 
management were either violated or ignored,…and plan, if 
known, was not given to the junior [officers] or troops.
This, of course, was an indictment of Young and support for 
MacDonald.
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individual was neglectful and on the 
contrary it would appear that care 
had been taken that this should not 
happen.77 
 The court was slightly more 
critical of the South Sasks: “the 
excessive loss of stores was largely 
due to the manner in which the 
withdrawal was carried out. Whether 
or not the unit withdrew at too early a 
stage, is not a matter for this court to 
decide.” The court added, “The losses 
were partly due to the counter-attack 
by tanks. The anti-tank guns all being 
destroyed before they even got into 
position, left the unit with PIATs only 
as anti-tank weapons. There was no 
armour support for the infantry.”78
 Even so, the brigade war diary 
claims that when Edmondson visited 
the brigadier at 1900 hours Young 
told him, “orders would be issued 
to the armour to cover him with 
protective	fire.”79 Edmondson denied 
receiving any such assurance or 
support, and no such assistance ever 
materialized.
 Y o u n g  a l s o  d e n i e d  t h a t 
MacDonald	 tried	 to	 reorganize	 the	
men	 of	 “A”	 and	 “B”	 Companies	
and further claimed that he himself 
made good ammunition and weapon 
deficiencies	with	2nd	Division.	As	we	
have	seen,	however,	MacDonald	tried	
to re-equip his men, but brigade was 
unable to accommodate his request. 
The war diary claims that the brigade 
commander’s “orders were made very 
clear	to	[MacDonald]	but	he	seemed	
to have lost complete control.”80 
However,	MacDonald	contended	that	
the orders were not clear to him and 
were contradictory:
i)	 That	I	should	continue	to	hold	
my [forward position].
ii)	 That	 I	 should	 organize	 an	
intermediate position with these 
remnants	of	A	and	B	Coys.
iii)	 That	 I	 could	withdraw	my	
[forward troops] to the intermediate 
position for reorganization and 
later reoccupation of the forward 
position.
iv)	 That	 I	must	 not	withdraw	
the [forward troops], but should 
continue to hold the intermediate 
position.
v)	 That	 I 	 should	 hold	 the	
intermediate position and so 
secure	the	[start-line]	for	the	RHC	
attack at 1800 hours.81
	 Sixth	Brigade’s	war	diary	further	
contends that at the end of 20 July, 
the Essex Scots were “in the process 
of being reformed to their original 
objective.”82 This statement implies 
that the Essex was not on its objective 
and that it needed re-forming. Neither 
implication is entirely accurate. The 
Essex Scots’ forward companies were 
where the brigadier ordered them to 
be, and they held the line all night 
long.
Conclusion
It is not difficult to understand why Young filed an adverse 
report	 against	MacDonald.	 It	was	
easier for him to claim that this 
battalion commander failed, not he 
himself.	 Reg	Matthews,	 the	 South	
Sasks’	 acting	CO,	 had	 been	 killed	
in action. The writer of the entry 
in	6th	Brigade’s	war	diary	refers	 to	
MacDonald’s	excited	state	but	wrote	
after it was clear that the battle was 
a failure. Any such references do not 
appear in the ops log or in the words 
of	MacDonald’s	men.	Edmondson’s	
account of the confusion at 6th 
Brigade	 HQ	 suggests	 l i t t le 	 to	
commend in its actions and decisions. 
The brigade’s war diary repeatedly 
refers to the South Sasks’ retreat as 
a “withdrawal to reorganize,” but 
implies that the Essex withdrawal 
was “out of control,” since “patrols 
were established to stop any further 
rearward movement of the Essex 
Scots,”	 the	 only	 non-6th	 Brigade	
battalion attacking that day.83 Such 
a contention would sustain Young’s 
complaint	that	MacDonald	had	lost	
control.
	 MacDonald	 acknowledged	 that	
the	 Black	Watch	 had	 regained	 the	
so-called lost ground that evening. 
But	 he	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 Black	
Watch did not secure any ground 
that the Essex had not already held 
the	 previous	 night.	 MacDonald	
claimed that had brigade offered 
any significant support, such as 
aggressive	tank	action,	artillery	fire,	
or a proper resupply, his unit could 
have held its forward positions as 
long as necessary. He added,“The 
area eventually reoccupied by the 
RHC	was	only	that	part	of	the	front	
finally held by the Essex Scottish 
prior	to	the	final	withdrawal,	and	this	
reoccupation was accomplished with 
all the real artillery and close tank 
support which was denied to us.”84
 So the question remains: why 
did the Essex suffer a defeat that 
day? This article has outlined two 
possible	 reasons.	 First,	 as	Brigadier	
Young	 claimed,	Lieutenant-Colonel	
MacDonald	had	 lost	 control	 of	 his	
battalion and become too nervous 
to exercise proper command and 
control.	Or,	 second,	 failure	was	 the	
result of a series of unavoidable 
circumstances, unattributable to 
one man alone. These include the 
confusion of battle; the dislocation 
caused by the withdrawal of the 
South Sasks directly through the 
Essex’s consolidation area; the 
subsequent retreat of its own forward 
companies; and the lack of effective 
communication both to lower-level 
commanders and to brigade, coupled 
with incessant and well-supported 
enemy infantry and tank attacks. 
These factors combined to make 
exercise of command and control 
impossible	 for	 MacDonald	 who	
nevertheless continued to issue 
orders and attempted to resupply and 
reorganize his men as per orders from 
brigade	HQ.	
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	 Brigade	HQ’s	failure	to	provide	
armoured support was compounded 
by deteriorating weather, which 
halted the planned artillery and 
aerial support, and the early loss of 
the infantry’s anti-tank weapons. 
Enemy	 infiltration	 into	 the	 forward	
positions also precluded substantial 
artillery assistance, which would 
have caused as many friendly as 
German casualties. The provision of 
adequate armoured support, which 
MacDonald	 repeatedly	 requested	
and which, by his account, met with 
Young’s incredulity and annoyance, 
would most likely have reduced 
Essex casualties and greatly increased 
chances	 of	 success.	One	need	 look	
no	 further	 than	 the	 Black	Watch,	
which launched its attack shortly 
after the Essex pulled out, with 
support from “the tanks of the 6th 
and 27th Armoured Regiments, and a 
formidable artillery programme.”85 
	 	Most	 of	 the	 evidence	 suggests	
that	Lieutenant-Colonel	MacDonald	
could have done little more than he did 
to maintain control and to recapture 
any lost ground. All indications 
suggest that Young, through his plan 
of attack and especially through his 
mismanagement of both infantry 
and armour, bears the greater share 
of responsibility for the operation’s 
failure. He was, therefore, careful in 
post-operation documents to infer 
that	enemy	artillery	and	mortar	fire	
and	MacDonald	were	the	problems,	
not enemy armour. The Essex Scottish 
Regiment suffered a defeat on the 
slopes of Verrières Ridge because of 
inadequate	 support	 from	Brigadier	
Young and the headquarters of the 
6th	Canadian	Infantry	Brigade.
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Soldiers of the 58th Battalion on their way to the trenches, June 1917.
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